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ABSTRACT
This paper examines shifts in the outputeffectsof unanticipated
inflation in the nineteenth—century United Stateshyestimatinga Lucas—type
aggregate supply function over the 184fl—1900 period. It is shown that, in
contrast to the twentieth-century experience in which there has been a
pronounced movement toward greater cyclical price rigidity, the nineteenth—
centuryoutput response to unanti cipated price changes wasroughly stable over
theperiod. Such stability is also particularly interesting in view of the
dramaticchanges in communications and transportation technology, particularly
the telegraph and the railroad, which greatly facilitated information flows
and thereby should have forced the price—surprise coefficient downward. Other
factors which may have offset the influence of these improvements in
information technology on the price—surprise coefficient include the reduced
general price level variability due to the goldstandard inthe posthel lum
period andthe possibility that the net effects of such improvements may in
fact have been small because shocks were able to spread more rapidly as
well. Finally, the perceived increase in cyclical pric rigidity over the
nineteenth century in the raw data is shown to have resulted not from a change
in price—surprise coefficient hut rather from an increased degree of





(804)924—325An important issue in macroeconomics has been whether the Phillips curve
relationship has been changing over time toward greater price rigidity over
the business cycle, It has often been argued that a given increase in the
level of unemployment is now associated with a smaller reduction in inflation
than had been true in the past.In other words, the suggestion is that the
output costs of lowering inflation has increased over time. Studies based
essentially on twentieth—century U.S. data (e.g., Cagan, 1975; Sachs, 1980) in
general confirm that the cyclical rigidity of prices has been increasing.' In
his Phillips curve estimates Sachs (p. 83) finds, for example, a dramatic
shift in the inflation—unemployment relationship between the pre—1929 and the
post—World War II period —theestimated coefficients fall by more than 70
percent.
Greater historical perspective would be useful in assessing long—term
shifts in the degree of price rigidity over the business cycle. Although
original studies of the Phillips curve (Phillips, 1958; Lipsey, 1960) were
based on historical data, relatively little attention has been devotedto
studying long—term changes since then.2 This paper therefore will consider
the American case between 1840 and 1900. The nineteenth—century experience
should be especially interesting in terms of informational theories of the
Phillips curve or aggregate supply (Phelps, 1970, pp. 6—7; Lucas, 1973). The
theory suggests that if the economy were composed of a large number of
scattered, competitive markets, or "islands", and information flows among them
are costly, suppliers of labor and goods would have difficulty in
distinguishing relative price changes from general movements in the price
level. The presence of imperfect information leads to a positive association
of price and output changes in the short run as suppliers misinterpret general
price level changes for relative price changes. In the nineteenth century—2--
when transportation and communication were significantly more difficult and
costly than today, this t1isiand' characterization of markets should be
particularly appropriate. In view of some difficulties in estimating positive
price—surprise terms in aggregate supply curves with contemporary data (Fair,
1979), the results for the nineteenth century in measuring the output response
to inflationary surprises should he of some interest.
The basic historical evidence for the period 1835—1975 is summarized in
Tables I and II, and also in Tables IA and hA. Tables I and II report the
total change in wholesale prices from peak to trough of the business cycle to
give an idea of the magnitude of decline, while Tables IA and hA present the
change in inflation rates resulting from the cycle. The change in inflation
is measured as the difference between the inflation rate in the year prior to
the peak of the cycle and the average rate of price change during the downturn
(following Sachs). The change in the gap btween actual real out-put and
potential output from peak to trough of the cycle (a widening of the GNP gap
carries a minus sign) is used as a measure of the magnitude of the cycle and
the cycles are grouped in terms of severity.3 Such a classification scheme
allows contractions of a similar degree of severity to be compared directly.
Note first of all however that three nineteenth—century periods, 1847-48,
1873—79, 1890—91, which had been previously classified as contractions on the
basis of movements of NRER business cycle indicators, were in fact
expansionary periods marked by a narrowing GNP gap. These, as a result, will
be omitted in the period comparisons which follow.
The increase in cyclical rigidity in the post—World War II period is
readily apparent. For mild contractions, downward price flexibility appears
to have ended with the post—World War II period and the size of the reduction
in the inflation rate declines significantly as well (the same is true for—3—
moderate contractions, but there is only one postwar observation here).
Longer term trends are more difficult to discern from the tables however, so
price and output gap changes over cyclical downturns with the trend line for
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries respectively are plotted in Figures I
and II. Comparing the nineteenth and twentieth century experience directly is
a rather dangerous enterprise because the figures are based on different data
sources and output variability in the nineteenth century may be
understated.4 Nevertheless, increased price rigidity (flatterslope) in the
twentieth century is certainly supported by the figures. Moreover, this trend
remains even when the data are divided into shorter periods. Regressions of
price change on output gap change with the observations grouped into three
periods—-pre—Civil War, Civil War to World War II, and post—World War Il——show
a progressively smaller coefficient in each period with the shifts being
statistically significant in a likelihood ratio test.5 Thi cuggestion of a
very long term trend toward increased price rigidity from the raw data (from
the antebellum period on) however is primarily for a bit of (perhaps
questionable) historical perspective. Problems of possibly incOmparable data
will he avoided by focusing on the nineteenth century.
Rather than such casual empiricism, as above, this paper will examine the
issue of changing price rigidity, or in the context of an aggregate supply
curve shifts in the output effects of unanticipated inflation, over the mid
and late nineteenth century more formally. Distinguishing between anticipated
and unanticipated inflation, I estimate an expectational aggregate supply
curve over the period 1840—60, 1870-1900. This period is particularly
interesting as well because it encompasses the diffusion of two of the most
important improvements in communications and transportation, the telegraph and
the railroad.It will be shown however that, notwithstanding the apparent-4-.
trend toward greater cyclical price rigidity and the dramatic improvements in
communications and transportation over the period, the output response to
inflationary surprises was remarkably stable over the last sixty years of the
nineteenth century. The sharp decline in the slope of tfie twentieth—century
Phillips curve therefore was not characteristic of the nineteenth century.
The estimation of the aggregate supply curve is described in Section I,
while the results are analyzed in Section II. The conclusions appear in
Section III, and the data are discussed in the Appendix.
II.
It is assumed that the aggregate supply function is the familiar
expectational form with lagged adjustment, as in Lucas (1973).
+a2(pt-.Etipt)
+a0 + Ut (1)
where y, and are logarithms of real output, real potential output,
and the price level respectively at time t. The variable Et_ipt represents
the public's expectation of the log of the price level in period t as of the
end of period t—1 based on information available at that point.
The gap between actual and potential output is a function of last
period's gap and the difference between the actual price level and the
public's expectation of it. Unanticipated price increases lead to increases
in real output, a result consistent with a negatively sloped short—run
Phillips curve, but a vertical long—run one. Gordon (1980, 1981, 1982) has
criticized such a specification for assuming complete rather than gradual—5—
price adjustment. Nevertheless, with annual data, as we have here, this does
not seem to be an unreasonable characterization.6
Potential output is taken to be a simple constant returns to scale Cobb—
Douglas function of exogenous factor inputs:
=ktkt+ Ltt + Tttt + At (2)
with Kt + Lt + Tt =1
where k, 9., and t are the logs of capital, labor, and land respectively;
Kt' Lt' and Tt are the factor shares; and At is the efficiency parameter at
time t.
Substituting (2) into (1), we may rewrite the supply curve as:
=Ktkt+ Lt9.t + Tttt
+ a1(y1- Kt1kt1 -Lt-19.t
-Tt1tt1) (3)
+ a2(p -Etipt)
+ a3timet + + Ut
where changes in the efficiency parameterAt are captured by a time trend.
Price expectations are taken to have been formed based on two lagged
values of the price level. They are 'economically rational't in the sense that
given available information at the time the public did not make systematic
errors in forming expectations of future price levels (Feige and Pearce,
1976). Such a specification seems particularly appropriate for the nineteenth-6-
century when information on exogenous variables must have been quite difficult
and costly to obtain.7
Equation (3) therefore was estimated concurrently with the price
forecasting equation by instrumental variables. The instruments used included
the exogenous and predetermined variables in the model plus the logs of the
money supply, government expenditures, and exports.8 The hypothesis of no
first—order autocorrelation is not rejected using Godfrey's ittest(1976).
The results for the equation estimated over the period 1841-1900 with a gap in
the 1860's appear in the first line of Table III. The coefficient of the
price surprise variable, pt—Et_ipt, is positive and statistically significant,
so that unanticipated increases in the price level elicits an increased supply
of output, as in the traditional expectational Phillips curve.9 This result
contrasts with the inability of Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 461) to
identify a statistically significant Phillips curve relationship in the United
States after 1867. With the exception of the interwar period, they find that
the relation between price change and output change, if anything, was negative
rather than positive.10 The influence of the lagged output gap is
significantly positive and the time trend is as well, consistent with
technical progress. The positive constant term might indicate some error in
the measurement of potential output.
fleviations from full employment in the aggregate supply function of
equation (1) are caused by aggregate demand shocks. Recent experience however
has shown that supply—side shocks, where price and output movements are
negatively rather than positively related, can also he important influences on
the output gap and hence on the observed Phillips—curve tradeoff (Gordon,
1982; Froyen and Waud, 1984). Supply shocks in agriculture (bad harvests,
etc.) may have been particularly important in nineteenth—century America, when—7—
agriculture constituted a much larger proportion of total output than today.
To allow for the influence of supply perturbations a supply-shock variable,
measured here as the relative price of food products)1 is included in the
aggregate supply equation. The results of the estimation are presented in the
second line of Table III. The coefficient of the supply—shock measure,Zt, is
not significantly different from zero, and the estimates of the other
coefficients are essentially unchanged from their values in line 1. Allowing
for agricultural supply shocks does not therefore affect our estimate of the
trdnff
Gordon (1982, pp. 1090—1091) derives another formulation of the aggregate
supply function in which the unanticipated component of nominal GNP change,





Toseparate the nominal GNP change into anticipated and unanticipated
components,the nominal change is regressed on two lagged values each of
changes in nominal GNP, the money stock, the rate of wholesale price change,
and the interest rate on government bonds, as well as the other right—hand
side variables in the supply equation —thelagged output gap and time. The
fitted values from the estimated equation are taken to represent expected
income change, and the residuals, unanticipated changes in nominal income.12
This proxy for UY was then used in the estimation of equation (4). The
results are reported in the third line of Table III. The estimated tradeoff
coefficient, a, is again significantly positive and also of a similar
magnitude(.6463)to those of the first two equations in Table III. The-8-
estimate of the Phillips curve parameter seems to he quite robust with respect
to alternate specifications of the aggregate supply function. On average 39
percent (1a) of the unanticipated nominal change showed up as output change
and 61 percent (-j-) as price change.
Did the Phillips curve relationship, that is, the output response to
unanticipated inflation as given by a2, shift over the nineteenth century?
The regression results from estimating equation (3) over two subperiods,
divided by the Civil War decade, which appear in the first two lines of Table
IV show an upward movement in the price—surprise coefficient a2.13 This is
supported as well by the set of regression results at the bottom of Table IV
in which the sample size is increased by five year increments. The pattern is
generally one of a steadily increasing a2 over the postbellurn period,
indicating a shift toward a flatter Phillips curve (a smaller unanticipated
price change associated with a given output change over the business cycle)
which Sachs argues is characteristic of the twentieth century. However, a
likelihood ratio test for a shift in a2 after the Civil War decade produces a
test statistic x2(1) =6.07,significant at the 5 percent level (3.84), but
not at the 1 percent level (6.63).14 Although there may have been a bit of
trend toward larger output responses to a given unanticipated price change in
the late nineteenth century, the shift does not appear nearly as pronounced as
that in the following century. In contrast to the twentieth-century
experience the output-unanticipated inflation tradeoff appears to have been
roughly stable over the 1840—1900 period.—9-
II.
Therelative stability of the price—surprise coefficientcx2 after 1840 is
remarkable in view of the dramatic improvements in technology,particularly
the telegraph and the railroad, which greatly facilitated informationflows
over the period. Commercial telegraphy beginning with Samuel F. B. Morse's
famous cable in 1844 spread rapidly across the tinitedStates, so that within a
decade more than 20,000 miles of telegraph line had beenput in place. From
its inception it was used primarily for businesspurposes, and its 'market
perfecting" impact in reducing information and transactions costs soon became
apparent (flu Boff, 1983, pp. 255—258). The railroad network in the United
States began to develop in the late antebellum periodas well. From its
beginnings in the 1830's, it tripled in size over the decade of the 1850's to
a total of over 30,000 miles by 1860, Growth in track mileage continied in
the postbellum period, although at slower rates. The railroadwas also an
important force in promoting the integration of dispersed local markets
(Chandler, 1977).
Some crude evidence of increased local market integrationmay be offered
in the form of a significant decrease in the degree ofgeographical price
dispersion over the early part of our period. Consider the variance of
averaged first differences of logarithms of regional price indices as a




where is the logarithm of the price index of region i at time t. Using
the Coelho and Shepherd (1974) indices of regional retail prices based on the
Weeks Report (they exclude the South Atlantic and Western regions) as the
price data, we see that the variance of regional price changes decreased by
about 30 percent between the decade of the 1850's and that of the 1870's.'5





where2 represents the variance of the "prior" distribution of the log of the
generalprice level forthe traders,is the variance of the distribution of
thedeviation of prices in individual markets from the average, and y is the
supply elasticity with respect to price surprises. The term in parentheses
then is the fraction of total individual price variance which is due to
relative price variation.
Cukierman (1979) in turn generalized a price—surprise aggregate supply
model to the case in which individuals may have access to price information
from other markets rather than just observing the current price in her own
market.In such a case the "Lucas type effect" becomes 2/(na2 +
wheren is the number of other markets from which the individual has access to
information. Information about general price movements is reinforced as the
individual samples more and more markets, so the ratio nc2/-r2 is an increasing
function of n. As n increases, r2/(nc12 +2)and hence a2 should decrease.
As the number of other markets observed grows larger, the output effect grows
weaker. Or, in other words, as price information becomes more widely diffused
in the economy, the slope of the Phillips curve should become steeper.— ii—
Moreover,improvements in communication and transportation should make
local market prices less subject to peculiarly local shocks. As a result, the
degree of local price variability should decline, which also decreases a2.
Both of these effects of improved communication and transportation technology,
access to price information from other markets and reduced local price
variability, therefore should work in the same direction, toward a fall in
a2• Suppliers of labor and goods would have been less likely to think that
general price increases represented relative price changes in their favor and
to increase output in response.
However, the price—surprise coefficient a2 (from Table IV) in fact
remained roughly stable, or increased slightly, rather than falling. What
forces offset the effects of improvements in information technology? First of
all, the net effects of such changes are less clear because even though
information is propagated more swiftly and efficiently throughout the economy,
shocks are spread more rapidly as well. The relative position of individuals
in local markets may have been largely unchanged if at the same time
information from other markets were available more rapidly, shocks from the
outside world impinged more quickly as well. For example, in the (pre—
telegraph) Panic of 1837 the wave of suspension of specie payments in local
banks radiating outward from New York reached Boston in two days, Pittsburgh
in five days, Detroit in seven days, and St. Louis in twelve days (Pred, 1973,
pp. 250—252). In contrast, during the Panic of 1873 suspension in other
financial centers followed that in New York almost immediately (Sprague, 1910,
p. 62).
In addition, the variance of the general price level, cr2, which also
affects a2, may have changed over the nineteenth century as well. The period
before the Civil War was marked by a bimetallic monetary standard, while from— 12—
theCivil War until Resumption in 1879 the United States was on a fiat
standard with floating exchange rates (the Greenback Era). In 1879 the
monetary regime was switched to the gold standard. Even thoughthe mean of
the distribution of the log of the price level changed little between the
antebellum and postbellum periods, the degree of unpredictability decreased
substantially —thevariance of residuals from the price forecasting equation
(log of prices regressed on two lagged values) declined from .278 for the
1841—60 period to .011 for 1871—1900, a shift that issignificantat the 1
percentlevel •17 The price level variance2 should be inversely related
to
a2from (5)-the higher the variance in the general price level, the less
favorablethe tradeoff will be.'8 Thus, a decrease in price level variability
or unpredictability resulting from the transition to convertibility (over the
1870's) and the adoption of the gold standard (after 1879) would have pushed
thea2 coefficient upward, contrary tothe influences of improved
transportation and communications.
Theeconometric evidence indicates that the price-surprise coefficient is
roughly stable over the 1840—1900 period, but at the same time the cyclical
price and output gap change data (Tables I and II) indicate a trend toward
increased cyclical price rigidity (or a smaller output response to price
changes) in the nineteenth as well as in the twentieth century. Such a trend
was not due to a change in a2 but rather in the lagged output gap coefficient
a,.
In Table IV the shift in a1 is clear. The estimated coefficient which
had been relatively small in magnitude and not statistically significantly
different from zero in the period before the Civil-War became much larger and
statistically significant in the period after the Civil War. The regressions
at the bottom of Table IV confirm this change, showing increases in the— 13—
magnitudeof the estimated a1 coefficients and their associated t statistics
as the sample period is extended into the postbeilum era. The influence of
the lagged output gap on the current gap appeared to be growing between 1840
and 1900. During a downturn, for example, the lagged effect of actual output
falling below potential output would pull current output farther below
potential than would have been predicted earlier. ceteris paribus. In other
words, increased inertia in the economy or increased persistence effects of
the.deviation of output from its potential level was responsible for the
- 10
apparent increase in cyclical rigidity.
Explanations for this rise in the importance of lagged effects must
remain primarily speculative here, but some possibilities may be identified.
The first is based on the dramatic increase in the rates of savings and
investment in the nineteenth-century United States. Over the middle third of
the century the share of capital formation in gross national product
approximately doubled.2° This sharp rise in the investment rate by itself
could have played an important role in magnifying persistence effects over
time periods if it takes some time to build new capital goods (Kydland and
Prescott, 1982). Also, multiplier effects could amplify and draw out the
influence of changes in the higher level of investment.
Another possible explanation is based on the increased specialization in
the U.S. economy and within manufacturing in particular. With the growth of
the manufacturing sector both capital and labor were applied to increasingly
specialized tasks. Over the nineteenth century, the use of skilled as opposed
to unskilled labor increased dramatically (Williamson and Lindert, 1980).
While unskilled workers may have found it relatively easy to move from one
industry to another, skilled workers were probably much less mobile across
industries at least in the short term. Much of the accumulated human capital- 14 -
mayhave been relatively task specific and hence not readily transferable into
other industries. Similarly, machines cane to be designed for increasingly
specialized purposes as well. Rosenberg (1976, pp. 9—31) describes the trend
toward greater specialization in the machine tool industry, for example, and
observes that 'by 1880 the proliferation of new machine tools in American
industry had begun to reach torrential proportionsH (p. 24). If both labor
and capital had been becoming more 'fixed" or industry—specific over time, the
economy would have adjusted more slowly to demand shocks. The growth of the
railroad expanded geographical markets and facilitated interregional factor
mobility, but at the same time increased human capital accumulation and
specialization may have raised the barriers to intersectoral or interindustry
mobility. As a result, the degree of inertia or persistence in the economy
nay also have increased.
III.
Even though the direction of the long—term trend in the Phillips curve
relationship has remained unchanged in the United States from at least 1840
onward——toward larger output changes in response to a given change in
unanticipated inflation——there appears to be a distinct difference between the
nineteenth and twentieth century experience. While the twentieth cehtury
shows a pronounced trend toward greater cyclical price rigidity, in the sense
that a given rise in unemployment is associated with smaller and smaller
reductions in inflation than in the past, in the period between 1840 and 1900
the change in the expectational Phillips curve tradeoff was so small that the
relationship could he judged to have been a roughly stable one.2' This— 15
relatively stable relationship persists even after taking possible changes in
the nature of shocks to the economy into account. The inclusion of asupply-
shock variable, relative agricultural prices, does not significantly affect
the estimated coefficients in the aggregate supply function.22
This essential stability of the price—surprise coefficient is
particularly noteworthy in view of the rapid expansion of the telegraph and
railroad after 1840, which by improving information flows should have led toa
steeper Phillips curve. Suppliers were less likely to be fooled into
changing output in response to a change in the aggregate price level. Since
a2 did not fall, other factors must have offset the influences of improved
information flows. It is possible that the net effects of such improvements
may have been small because shocks as well as new information were able to
spread more rapidly. Another counteracting effect ona2 may have been the
decreased variability of the general price level resulting from the move to
the gold standard. Sufficient information on the functioning of nineteenth—
century labor markets is not available to assess whether there were
substantial changes in the nature and extent of implicit contracting (in turn
affecting a2), but it is a possibility in view of the dramatic changes in
labor force composition over the period.
The trend toward greater cyclical price rigidity over the nineteenth
century observed in the pattern of price and output gap changes over
successive business cycles therefore were not so much the result of a shift in
the output response to unanticipated inflation but rather of the increased
influence of the lagged output gap on current output. The degree of inertia
or persistence in the economy increased markedly over the per'iod due perhaps
to the sharp rise in the investment share of GNP or increased specialization— 16 —
inthe economy which made adjustment to shocks and intersectoral mobility more
difficult.
The movement toward a substantially flatter Phillips curve relationship
(larger a2) whichappears characteristic of recent experience therefore does
not seem to have been true for the earlier period. It in fact then is
essentially a twentieth century phenomenon. Sachs (1980, pp. 87-88)
emphasizes the influence of countercyclical macroeconomic policy and the
spreadof long—term wage contracts particularly after World War II in reducing
cyclicalflexibility. However, Spencer (1977) finds a significant decrease in
downward cyclical flexibility of individual prices from industries
experiencing increases in concentration over the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. Perhaps the merger wave and attendent increases in
industrial concentration should be accorded more attention in studies of
increases in cyclical rigidity.Data Appendix
The annual real output series used here developed by Robert Gailman is
unpublished but well known.23 Beginning in the mid 1830's, there is a gap
over the decade of the 1860's. The years before 1859, which were Census years
in the original series, have been interpolated into calendar years. A
potential difficulty with this series for measuring cyclical fluctuations is
that it omits changes in inventories. Evidence for the post—World War I
period suggests that inventory fluctuations are very significant in business
cycles (Abrarnovitz, 1950; Blinder and Holtz—Eakin, 1984). Neglecting
inventory shifts then would understate the degree of output variability in the
nineteenth century. Data are not available to measure these inventory shifts
directly, while contradictory influences make it difficult to puzzle out the
relative degree of nineteenth—century inventory fluctuations. On the nne
hand, improvements in communications and transportation, particularly the
railroad, have been widely argued to have reduced the level of inventory
holdings substantially, and thus the ratio of inventories to GNP (Du Boff,
1983). On the other hand, the shift in inventory composition away from farm
to more manufacturing over the period may have increased total variability.
Kuznets' solution to this problem involved simply projecting a regression
line between annual inventory change on annual commodity output change for the
interwar period back to the nineteenth century and calculating fitted values
(1961, p. 601; also Kendrick, 1961, p. 277). This method, of course, does not
capture any effects from structural change that may have been occurring. This
measure of inventory change in turn was incorporated into Friedman and
Schwartz's income estimates which begin in 1869 (1982, p. 100). However,
estimating the aggregate supply curve (3) over the postbellum period with theFriedman and Schwartz real income figures produced results very similar to
those from the regressions based on the Gallnan series. For example, the
Friedman and Schwartz price—surprise coefficient, a2, differed from the
reported one by only +.f)45, or less than 10 percent, with compa-rable t
statistics. The degree to which a2 is underestimated because the omission of
inventory shifts understates output variability appears quite small, at least
based on the Kuznets estimate of inventory changes. The Kuznets adjustment
for inventory changes therefore would not appear to imply a different pattern
of results or conclusions from those in the paper based on the Gailman series.
Alternative series do not appear to be superior to the Gailman one in
measuring output fluctuations. In particular, Romer (1984) has argued that
the Frickey index of industrial production (1947) exaggerates the volatility
of the pre-World War I economy. Such a measure may not be an accurate
reflection of changes in aggregate output in any case in view of the
substantialsectoral shift in the distribution of output that was taking place
overthe period, with the share of agriculture in national income falling from
26 to 15 percent, and that of manufacturing and mining was rising from 14 to
25 percent over the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the
Gallman measure has the advantage of extending back into the antebellum
period, which is especially interesting because of the spread of the telegraph
and the railroad, while neither the Friedman and Schwartz income series nor
the Frickey industrial production index go back before the Civil War.
There was considerable variation in the rate of growth of real output
across subperiods between 1840 and 1900 (Abramovitz and David, 1973, p. 431),
so a simple time trend is not a satisfactory measure of the growth of
potential output over the period. The potential output series used in theregressions is built up from constructed annual series for capital, labor, and
land.
Annual real capital stock figures were based on Davis and Gailman's
Census year capital—output ratios (1973, p. 457) and Gallman's annual gross
capital formation series. Using Census year capital stock figures as
benchmarks, one may solve for average decadal depreciation rates and thus for
an annual capital stock series. Davis and Gallman (1973, pp. 463—466) show
that capital stock figures calculated from investment flows are quite close to
those from Census year benchmarks so that the capital stock and flow data,
even though they come from different sources, are reasonably consistent and
combining them, as is done here, is basically legitimate.24 The Davis and
Galiman capital—output ratio estimates run from 1840 to 1900,whichlimits the
time period for the regressions to those dates. In any case, the Gallman real
output series extends only a few years earlier, into the mid 1830's.
Estimates of land inputs are calculated from Davis and Gailman's
estimates of capital plus land-output ratios for Census years (p. 457) and
then interpolated. Labor force figures are constructed from annual population
estimates (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 8) and Lebergott's estimates of
the labor force by Census years (Lehergott, 1964, p. 510). There were
dramatic changes in the size of relative factor shares over this period, with
the capital share rising from .27 to .37 between the 1834/36-1853/57 and the
1888/92—1903/07 periods, while the labor share fell from .62 to .54, so
clearly constant factor shares can not be assumed. Instead, time series for
the factor shares__L, Kt' and$T__are constructed by interpolating between
midpoints of David's 15 year periods (1977, p. 189). Technical progress, the
change in the efficiency parameter At, is captured by a time trend in the
regressions.
25An alternative measure of potential output derived from projecting from a
benchmark year of full employment along a trend rate of growth may also be
constructed. In this case, estimates of y are projected forward from the
base year of 1834 using growth rates interpolated from David's period
estimates of growth in real product (1977, p. 189). This estimate is used in
calculating the output gap changes in Tables I and II, and IA and hA, because
we don't know the values of At in our first measure of potential output. The
same pattern of regression results remain if the trend growth rate projected
measure is used as y. with a2increasingsomewhat from .5977 to .8411 between
the antebellum and postbellum periods.
The price level is measured by the Warren-Pearson index of wholesale
prices (1933, pp. 25—27). The underlying data for the series are primarily
price quotations from New York markets. Changes in the degree of local price
variability across regions therefore are not captured directly in the price
series. While changes in price variability across products may be reflected
in the index, the influence of increasing integration of geographical markets
is reflected only in so far as it affects local price variability in New
York. However, the alternative price index spanning the period, the David and
Solar cost—of—living index of retail prices (1977, p. 21) is based on retail
price quotations from only Massachusetts and Pennsylvania and thus its
geographical coverage is only slightly greater than the Warren—Pearson.
The degree of variability in the wholesale price index is significantly
greater than in the David and Solar consumer price index (David and Solar,
1977, pp. 20-21). For one thing, rent enters the index with a fairly large
weight (17.7 percent for 1851—1880), and such prices are likely to be rather
sticky in the short run (p. 55). Moreover, if the retail price markup adjusts
only slowly with a lag to changes in the wholesale market (pp. 52—55), thedegree of variability in retail prices will he reduced for that reason as
well.It would seem that the wholesale price index would be the one more
relevant to suppliers in making output decisions, so we shall choose the
Warren—Pearson index for this paper.26 Ideally, we might prefer a GNP
deflator series as the measure of but one is not available for this
pen od.
As for the other instrumental variables, government expenditures are
taken as the sum of federal outlays (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 1114)
and total state and local government expenditures (Davis and Legler, 1966),
which constituted a substantial part of the total in the nineteenth century.
Estimates of the money and specie stocks for the antebellum period are from
Stevens (1971); for the postheilum period they are taken from Friedman and
Schwartz (1970). Finally, exports are taken from (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1975, pp. 864—865).Notes
1,Gordon (1980), who finds a stable relation over the period, is one
exception to this generalization, but his estimates are not based on the
expectational Phillips curve specification. Wachter (1976) finds au contraire
increasing cyclical responsiveness in wages in the postwar period, but Sachs
(pp. 82—84) argues that his equations were misestimated.
2.Lipsey (1960, p. 27) also identifies a shift in the relationship in the
U.K.in the first part of the twentieth—century, around World War I - 'The
post-1922 experience was of less flexibility of wages in response to excess
demand, whether positive or negative, than occurred in the pre-1914 period."
3.This classification scheme follows Sachs (1980, p. 81). However, the
classifications of the cycles themselves may differ because his criterion is
the change in the gap between actual and the trend level of industrial
production rather than between actual and potential real output. For example,
the contraction of 1902—1904 which Sachs classes as moderate is identified
here as mild; the downturn of 1918—19, labeled as strong by Sachs, is moderate
here. The measure of potential output used here is described in the Data
Appendix.
4.The Gailman GNP figures for the nineteenth century omit inventories.
Since inventory fluctuations may have been significant over business cycles,
output fluctuations will be understated (see the discussion in the
Appendix). Also, to the extent that the derivation of the annual series
involved some interpolation some high frequency variability will be lost and
annual output variability understated.
5. x(2)=8.88,which is significant at the 5 percent level. The estimated
coefficients for the time periods are 2.37, .73, and -2.31 respectively. Asimilar grouping for inflation rate changes as the dependent variable shows
the same pattern of decreasing coefficients, but is not statistically
significant by the likelihood ratio test.
6.Moreover, in Gordon's gradual price adjustment equation estimated on
quarterly data for the 1892—1929 period, the closest we can come to the
nineteenth century, the mean lag of past inflation variables was less than a
year and the coefficient of the lagged difference between actual and potential
output was quite small (.02). (Gordon, 1982, p. 1104)
7. In addition, adding lagged fiscal and monetary variables, such as
government expenditures or the money supply, to the price forecasting equation
makes very little difference to the reported results.
8.Minor variations in the list of instruments, such as replacing the money
stock by the specie stock or adding some international variables (see James,
1984, pp. 198—199) made no essential difference in the results.
9. Perhapsitshould be reiterated here that because the dependent variable
may understatethe true level of output variability, the estimate of a2 here
may be a hit too low. See note 4.
10. Their specification however differs from the one used here. They use
unanticipated price change as the dependent variable and unanticipated money
stock change and the output gap as independent variables. On the other hand,
in this aggregate supply function and also in the relationship studied by
Irving Fisher (1926) on early twentieth—century data the output gap is taken
as the dependent variable.
11. Using relative agricultural prices as a measure of supply shocks would be
appropriate in a closed economy, but the nineteenth-century United States was
a significant exporter of agricultural products. In that case, high foreign
demand could lead to high relative farm prices, but it would be caused by ademand rather than supply shock. Therefore exports as a percentage of GNP can
be included in our supply shock variable with a negative sign, ZZt= Zt —
x/y,
to reduce foreign demand influences. The new variable should respond
primarily to domestic supply shocks. However, when such a variable was
included in the aggregate supply curve, its coefficient also was not
significantly different from zero, and the estimates of the other coefficients
were not significantly different from those reported in Table II. The
conclusion reached in the text still appears to stand and is consistent with
Teniin's argument that the antebellum business cycle was driven by demand
shocks (1974).
Alternative measures, the relative price of farm products or the rate of
change of food prices, relative to the wholesale price index, (Warren and
Pearson, 1933, pp. 25—27), made no significant difference to the reported
results.
12. This procedure is described in more detail in Gordon (1982, pp. 1096—
1097, 1099).
13.In his estimates of the output—inflation tradeoff for the nineteenth—
century United States, Easton (1984, p. 526) finds a similar upward shift in
theprice—surprise coefficient.
14. A test for a shift in the pattern of price forecasting over the two
suhperiods cannot reject the null hypothesis of stability. The test statistic
F(2,53) =1.03 was much less than the critical value of 4.08 at the 5 percent
level.
15.The decadal variance in the 1860's however actually increased, presumably
dueto the Civil War.
16.It should perhaps be noted that the influence of the spread of the
telegraph in lowering the cost of obtaining price information from othermarkets is not captured explicitly in the specification of the price
forecasting equation based on lagged general price level changes, and it is
not clear how it should he modeled. One possibility is adding a time trend to
-theequation to represent improvements in the forecast over time due to
increased information availability. In that case, the level, patterns of
shift, and t statistics of the price—surprise coefficients in equation (3)
remain essentially the same as those reported in the text. Rather
interestingly the time trend coefficient in the forecasting equation is
significantly different from zero in the antebellum period when telegraph and
rail systems were expanding rapidly, but not in the postbellum period under
the gold standard. The coefficient was also not significant when the equation
was estimated over the whole period.
17. The test statistic F(20,30) =25.49is much larger than the 1 percent
significance level, 2.77. Comparing the entire antebellum period, 1801—60,
with the 1871—1900 produces an even greater decline in variance, and omitting
the years during and after the War of 1812 does not alter the results.
Similarly, adding a time trend to the regression (in order to allow for a
change in the mean over time) does not affect the results either.
18. The larger the shocks to the economy as evidenced in the degree of price
level variability, the more incentive there is to distinguish between the
nominal and real components of any nominal income change (Aiberro, 1981, p.
248). Cukierman (1979) suggests that as 2 falls, individuals need to sample
price information in fewer other markets, so changes in n reinforce the effect
of changes in c2 on a2 for a given technology.
19. This increased lag implies that the total effect of a price surprise on
output would have risen significantly over the nineteenth century even though
the contemporaneous effect remained roughly stable. The total multiplier ofthe price surprise, a2/(1 —a1),
increased by 300 percent between the
antebellum and posthellum periods.
20.In the 1839—1848 decade capital formation constituted an 11—12 percent
share of GNP, while by 1879-1888 it had increased to 19 percent, and to 20—22
percent by 1889—1898. (Davis and Gallman, 1973, P. 439)
21. Data limitations unfortunately prevent the period from being extended
earlier than 1840, but the early part of the century is a very interesting
periodas wel 1.Even without technol ogi cal changes asdramatic as the
telegraphandthe railroad, there appear to have been significant improvements
in information flows. Rothenberg, for example, in her study of Massachusetts
farmers (1981, pp. 300-305) finds pronounced declines in the coefficient of
variation over time for many crops, even early in the century when no
important transport innovations had yet occurred. Pred (1973, pp. 20-77)
finds a substantial decline in time lag of public information disseniation
among cities before 1840 based on examinations of local newspapers. In
addition if observations before 1840 had been available, we would have been
able to observe the effects on the aggregate supply function of a dramatic
change in information technology. Quite suggestively, David and Solar (1977,
p. 30) find a marked dampening in the amplitude of short-term cycles in their
change in labor—cost of living series. While many of the peak and trough
rates of change were greater than +10 or —10 percent per annum before 1840,
the fluctuations in subsequent years were significantly smaller.
22. Structural change in the economy may affect the nature of the shocks. As
the economy moved over time from an emphasis on agriculture to relatively more
emphasis on manufacturing, the nature of shocks to the economy may have
changed also —fromsupply shocks, where price and output changes are
inversely related, associated with agriculture (bad harvests), to demandshocks, where price and output changes are positively related, more associated
with manufacturing. If this had been the case and price and output changes
were becoming more and more positively associated, then a2wouldhave been
forced up over time due to structural change. We may reject this possibility
however because including a variable to capture the influence of supply shocks
explicitly left the other coefficients essentially unaffecteth
23. Obtained through private correspondence from Robert E. Gallman.
24. A bit more evidence and detail on this point is available in James (1984,
p. 211).
25. However, the changes in relative factor shares in fact suggest that
technical change may have actually been more complex than the neutral
specification postulated here. See David (1977).
26. However, the David and Solar consumer price index produces roughly the
same pattern of regression results. Since the variance o the index is
smaller than that of the Warren-Pearson series the estimateda2 coefficients
are larger.Table I
Price and Real Output Gap Changes During Business Cycles:
Mild Contractions, 1835—1975


















Sources: The timing of nineteenth—century business cycles is taken from the
NBER reference cycles (Hughes and Rosenberg, p. 485; Burns and Mitchell, pp.
102-103). Nineteenth—century price movements are based on the Warren-Pearson
wholesale price index (Warren and Pearson, pp. 25—27) and the twentieth
century on the BLS wholesale price index (U.S. Historical Statistics, p.
200). Nineteenth—century real output movements are based on the Galiman
series, while the twentieth—century figures are taken from Gordon (1981, pp.
xv—xvii ).
Notes:The change in prices is calculated as the percentage change in the log
of the price index from peak to trough.
GAP is measured as the difference in the logarithms of actual real
output and full employment output. The change in GAP therefore is the
differencebetwee its values at the peak and trough ofthe cycle,
LGAP = GAP—GAP.Thisprocedure follows Sachs (1980,p. 81), although he
measuresdeviations in industrial production rather than in real output. As a
result, the two measures of cyclical severity are not strictly comparable.
The cycles are grouped according to degrees of cyclical severity here as well,
but the criteria are somewhat different: Mild contactions —5 < zGAPx100;
Moderate contractions, —10 < AGAPx100 < -5; Severe contractions,
tGAPx1O0 < -10. —Table IA




































































































Price and Real Output Gap Changes During Business Cycles:
Moderate and Severe Contractions, 1835—1975







































Inflation and Real Output Gap Changes During Business Cycles:

































































4.8 - 3.6 - 8.4
10.8 -46.0 -56.8
— 1.7 - 7.68 - 5.98Table III
Estimates of the Aggregate Supply Function, 1841-1858, 1871—1900














.6463 +.0012time -.3675 +
(1+.6463)
+.6334(st-i --i
(3.80) (7.78) (3.45) (—4.31)Table IV
Aggregate Supply Function Estimated Over Subperiods
(t statistics in parentheses)
,* !.r. — —L_] — ut.' Lirnet
TimePeriod a1 a2 a3 a0
1841—58 .1989 .3516 .0050 —.9511
(.81) (2.07) (2.31) (—3.24)
1871-1900 .6370 .4774 .0010 -.3450
(4.93) (3.13) (1.03) (—2.39)
1841—58, 71—75 .2446 .4349 .00206 -.7386
(1.15) (2.43) (1.81) (—3.32)
1841—58, 71—80 .1522 .6416 .00313 -.8822
(.72) (4.00) (3.45) (—4.09)
1841—58, 71—85 .4189 .4902 .00271 -.6399
(2.88) (3.75) (3.26) (—3.86)
1841-58, 71—90 .4333 .5160 .00240 -.6077
(3.20) (4.06) (3.45) (—4.04)
1841—58, 71—95 .4435 .5662 .00241 —.5823
(3.46) (4.24) (3.46) (—4.16)
1841—58, 71—1900.5236 .5495 .00168 -.4881
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